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We show that the stock market downturns of 2000-2002 and 2007-2009 have very
diﬀerent proximate causes. The early 2000’s saw a large increase in the discount rates
applied to proﬁts by rational investors, while the late 2000’s saw a decrease in ratio-
nal expectations of future proﬁts. We reach these conclusions by using a VAR model
of aggregate stock returns and valuations, estimated both without restrictions and
imposing the cross-sectional restrictions of the ICAPM. Our ﬁndings imply that the
2007-2009 downturn was particularly serious for rational long-term investors, whose
losses were not oﬀset by improving stock return forecasts as in the previous recession.
JEL classiﬁcation:G 1 2 ,N 2 21I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the past 15 years, the US stock market has experienced two long booms, in
each case followed by a sharp downturn. From the end of March 1994 through the
end of March 2000, the S&P 500 index rose 221% in current dollars and 177% after
adjustment for inﬂation. In the following two years (from March 2000 to September
2002), it declined 39% (42% in real terms). Similarly, from September 2002 to
September 2007 the S&P 500 rose 75% (51%) and from September 2007 to March
2009 declined 44% (45%).
How should we interpret these dramatic ﬂuctuations, and how do they compare
with the ﬂuctuations of stock market prices we observed in the last century? Adopt-
ing the perspective of a rational investor or stock market analyst, should we think
of the stock market booms as reﬂecting good news about future corporate proﬁts,
discounted at a constant rate as in traditional “random walk” models of stock prices?
Alternatively, were stock prices instead driven up by declines in the discount rates
that rational investors applied to corporate cash ﬂows? Then, when the booms ended,
did prices fall because rational investors became pessimistic about proﬁts, or because
they discounted future proﬁts more heavily?2
Answers to these questions are important for several reasons. The answers tell
us about the proximate causes of stock market ﬂuctuations, and they allow us to track
the rational outlook for the stock market over time. If the hard times experienced by
stock market investors in 2000-02 and 2007-09 were due to lower expected corporate
proﬁts, then those conditions were permanent in the sense that rational investors
had no reason to expect stock prices to rebound to previous levels. On the other
hand, if those hard times were driven by an increase in discount rates, or equivalently
expected future returns, then it was rational to expect stock prices to recover over
time, and in this sense the hard times were temporary.
The nature of a stock market downturn also determines the optimal consumption
response of a long-term investor. A long-term investor with an elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution (EIS) less than one should cut consumption less when discount
rates increase than when expected proﬁts decline; the reverse is true for a long-term
investor with EIS greater than one, who should save aggressively when discount rates
increase.
2An increase in the discount rates applied by rational investors can occur for several reasons:
an increase in aggregate risk; an increase in the risk aversion of rational investors; or a transfer
of aggregate risk from irrational to rational investors, as in models with noise traders who have
ﬂuctuating sentiment and sell stocks to rational investors when they become pessimistic.
1In this paper we argue that the downturns of 2000–02 and 2007–09 have very
diﬀerent proximate causes. In 2000–02, stock prices fell primarily because discount
rates increased, while in 2007–09 cash ﬂow prospects worsened, with discount rates
playing only a minor role until late 2008. Similarly, the preceding booms were driven
primarily by discount rates in the 1990’s and by a mix of cash ﬂows and discount rates
in the mid-2000’s. Looking back to the history of booms and busts in the US since
1929, we ﬁnd only a few other episodes driven mainly by cash ﬂow news, namely the
onset of the Great Depression and the recession of 1937–8. These, like the current
crisis, were particularly hard times. Most other episodes, instead, were driven mainly
by discount rate news (with or without a delayed response of cash ﬂow news), with
much less severe consequences for a long-term investor.
We reach these conclusions using a structured econometric approach with three
main ingredients: ﬁrst, a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of aggregate stock re-
turns, valuation ratios, and other relevant ﬁnancial variables; second, the approximate
accounting identity of Campbell and Shiller (1988); and third, the cross-sectional re-
strictions of the intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) of Merton (1973)
and Campbell (1993), as implemented empirically by Campbell (1996), Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004), and Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010). Relative to these
earlier papers, our novel contribution is to estimate the aggregate VAR jointly with
the cross-sectional restrictions of the ICAPM, thereby reducing uncertainty about the
components of stock market ﬂuctuations under the assumption that the ICAPM is
correct.
We impose the ICAPM restrictions as additional moments in a Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation of the VAR system because forecasting the
equity premium with a pure time-series-based approach is a diﬃcult task. Conse-
quently, exploiting the economic logic of a cross-sectional asset-pricing model can help
sharpen forecasts if the model imposed does a reasonably good job describing pat-
terns in average returns. We join others in arguing that imposing such economically
reasonable guidelines can be useful in forecasting subsequent excess market returns.3
A formal test based on the standard Diebold and Mariano (1995) out-of-sample test
statistic, adjusted using the methodology of Clark and West (2006, 2007), conﬁrms
3Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b) and Fama and French (1989) argue that high stock prices
should imply a low equity premium. Merton (1980) argues that the equity premium should usually
be positive because of risk aversion. Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho (2006) argue that the
cross-sectional pricing of risk should be consistent with the time-series pricing of risk, and assume
the CAPM to make that comparison. Campbell and Thompson (2008) argue that imposing the
restrictions of steady-state valuation models improves forecasting ability.
2that our novel approach of imposing ICAPM restrictions is indeed useful in improving
out-of-sample predictability.
Of course, the VAR methodology used in the above tests relies on speciﬁc as-
sumptions about the data-generating process. However, our robustness tests indicate
that our main conclusions are relatively insensitive to most aspects of the estima-
tion methodology. Moreover, we show that our use of cross-sectional theory appears
to discipline the analysis and reduce the danger of overﬁtting the data as our main
conclusions are relatively insensitive to the particular variables included in the VAR.
Furthermore, although we argue that our VAR implementation is reasonable, we also
show that our ﬁndings about the proximate causes of the 2000–2002 and 2007–09
downturns are consistent with a much simpler, less theoretically structured analysis
of ﬁnancial and macroeconomic data.
Beyond simply forecasting the equity premium, our results provide insight into
the process by which the market prices the cross-section of equities. The model
we impose argues that value stocks do better than growth stocks on average, but
underperform during those stock market downturns that are permanent, in the sense
that they reﬂect expectations of lower corporate proﬁts in the future. Our empirical
success conﬁrms that this economic model was a useful description of the recent US
stock market experience. These results are particularly interesting as much if not all
of this recent experience is subsequent to the samples of Campbell (1996), Campbell
and Vuolteenaho (2004), and Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010).
Other work has used implications from the cross section to derive new equity
premium predictors. For example, Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho (2006) point
out that if the CAPM is true, a high equity premium implies low prices for stocks
with high betas. Relative valuations of high-beta stocks can therefore be used to
predict the market return. Though their CAPM-based equity premium predictor
does well in the pre-1963 subsample, it performs poorly in the post-1963 subsample,
perhaps not surprising given the poor performance of the CAPM in that period.
Unlike Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho (2006), not only do we use an asset-pricing
model (the ICAPM) that has had better empirical success in the post-1963 sample,
we estimate a time series model that is restricted to be consistent with cross-sectional
pricing. In recent work, Kelly and Pruitt (2011) propose a statistical methodology
to aggregate the cross-section of valuation ratios to improve the prediction of market
returns. However, they do not impose theory-motivated restrictions in the estimation.
Our results suggest that tests of the Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) implemen-
tation of the ICAPM that jointly estimate both the VAR coeﬃcients and the pricing
3parameters together will be favorable to that model. Not only will the model’s
pricing performance improve but the integrity of the resulting news terms may not
be dramatically sacriﬁced. Though a joint estimation approach will twist the VAR
coeﬃcients away from the OLS estimates used by Campbell and Vuolteenaho, in or-
der to better ﬁt the more precisely measured cross-sectional pricing implications, the
resulting equity premium forecasts perform well out of sample.
Our ﬁnal contribution is to expand the set of variables included in the Campbell
and Vuolteenaho VAR. We speciﬁcally add the default yield spread, as shocks to this
variable should contain information about future corporate proﬁts. Consistent with
this intuition, our restricted VAR (that imposes ICAPM conditions in the estimation)
chooses to include the default spread as an important component of aggregate cash-
ﬂow news.4 Interestingly, though the key variable of Campbell and Vuolteenaho, the
small-stock value spread, continues to be an important component of market news,
its role does not seem as critical in our structured econometric approach. This helps
to address concerns about the sensitivity of the results in Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004) and Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010) to the inclusion of the small-stock
value spread.
A precursor to our paper is Ranish (2009). This paper also argues that cash-
ﬂow news was relatively important in the downturn of 2007-09, but it does so using
high-frequency data and does not seek to use the restrictions of asset pricing models
to improve the precision of the return decomposition. More recently, Lettau and
Ludvigson (2011) have used cointegration analysis of aggregate consumption and
major components of wealth to distinguish permanent and transitory movements in
wealth. Consistent with our ﬁndings, Lettau and Ludvigson argue that the 2000-02
downturn was almost entirely driven by transitory shocks, while the 2007-09 downturn
reﬂected both permanent and transitory shocks.
Our paper also relates to the macroeconomics literature that studies the nature
and origins of business cycles. At least since Burns and Mitchell (1946), economists
have tried to understand whether all US business cycles can be attributed to a com-
4Previous research including Fama and French (1989) focuses on the ability of the default spread
to forecast the equity premium, ignoring the implications of the estimated data-generating process
for the relation between shocks to the default spread and aggregate cash-ﬂow news. In speciﬁcations
that include only the term spread, Fama and French ﬁnd that the default spread forecasts aggregate
stock returns with a positive sign. In richer speciﬁcations that include other variables such as
the price-earnings ratio, our joint estimation procedure ﬁnds that the partial regression coeﬃcient
forecasting returns is negative, implying an intuitive negative relation between aggregate cash-ﬂow
news and shocks to the default yield.
4mon set of shocks, or whether diﬀerent cycles are driven by diﬀerent shocks. While
Burns and Mitchell focus on graphing the behavior of diﬀerent variables during the cy-
cle, Blanchard and Watson (1986) use a statistical approach to summarize the cyclical
behavior of the variables studied. We provide a counterpart to both exercises in our
paper, for stock market cycles rather than business cycles. In Section 6 we conduct a
graphical analysis of the history of booms and busts in the stock market during the
twentieth century. In Sections 2-5, we decompose, using econometric methods, the
main stock market cycles into their cash-ﬂow and discount-rate components, guided
in this by the insights of intertemporal asset pricing theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our
methodology for identifying the components of stock returns. Section 3 discusses the
data and our econometric methods. Section 4 presents our VAR estimates, both with
and without ICAPM restrictions. Section 5 contrasts the two boom-bust cycles of
the late 1990’s and early 2000’s and the mid to late 2000’s. Section 6 compares these
cycles with other stock market ﬂuctuations that have occurred since 1929. Section 7
concludes. An online Appendix (Campbell, Giglio, and Polk 2012) presents various
robustness exercises which we summarize in the text.
2I d e n t i f y i n g t h e C o m p o n e n t s o f S t o c k R e t u r n s
2.1 Cash-ﬂow and discount-rate shocks
Campbell and Shiller (1988) provide a convenient framework for analyzing cash-ﬂow
and discount-rate shocks. They develop a loglinear approximate present-value rela-
tion that allows for time-varying discount rates. Linearity is achieved by approximat-
ing the deﬁnition of log return on a dividend-paying asset, rt+1 ≡ log(Pt+1 +Dt+1)−
log(Pt),a r o u n dt h em e a nl o gd i v i d e n d - p r i c er a t i o ,(dt − pt),u s i n gaﬁ r s t - o r d e rT a y l o r
expansion. Above, P denotes price, D dividend, and lower-case letters log trans-
forms. The resulting approximation is rt+1 ≈ k + ρpt+1 +( 1− ρ)dt+1 − pt ,where
ρ and k are parameters of linearization deﬁned by ρ ≡ 1
￿￿
1+e x p ( dt − pt)
￿
and
k ≡−log(ρ) − (1− ρ)log(1/ρ− 1).W h e n t h e d i v i d e n d - p r i c e r a t i o i s c o n s t a n t , t h e n
ρ = P/(P + D), the ratio of the ex-dividend to the cum-dividend stock price. The
approximation here replaces the log sum of price and dividend with a weighted aver-
age of log price and log dividend, where the weights are determined by the average
relative magnitudes of these two variables.
5Solving forward iteratively, imposing the “no-inﬁnite-bubbles” terminal condition
that limj→∞ ρj(dt+j − pt+j)=0 ,t a k i n ge x p e c t a t i o n s ,a n ds u b t r a c t i n gt h ec u r r e n t
dividend, one gets
pt − dt =
k
1 − ρ
+E t
∞ ￿
j=0
ρ
j[∆dt+1+j − rt+1+j] , (1)
where ∆d denotes log dividend growth. This equation says that the log price-dividend
ratio is high when dividends are expected to grow rapidly, or when stock returns are
expected to be low. The equation should be thought of as an accounting identity
rather than a behavioral model; it has been obtained merely by approximating an
identity, solving forward subject to a terminal condition, and taking expectations.
Intuitively, if the stock price is high today, then from the deﬁnition of the return
and the terminal condition that the dividend-price ratio is non-explosive, there must
either be high dividends or low stock returns in the future. Investors must then expect
some combination of high dividends and low stock returns if their expectations are
to be consistent with the observed price.
Campbell (1991) extends the loglinear present-value approach to obtain a de-
composition of returns. Substituting (1) into the approximate return equation gives
rt+1 − Et rt+1 =( E t+1 − Et)
∞ ￿
j=0
ρ
j∆dt+1+j − (Et+1 − Et)
∞ ￿
j=1
ρ
jrt+1+j (2)
= NCF,t+1 − NDR,t+1,
where NCF denotes news about future cash ﬂows (i.e., dividends or consumption), and
NDR denotes news about future discount rates (i.e., expected returns). This equation
says that unexpected stock returns must be associated with changes in expectations
of future cash ﬂows or discount rates. An increase in expected future cash ﬂows is
associated with a capital gain today, while an increase in discount rates is associated
with a capital loss today. The reason is that with a given dividend stream, higher
future returns can only be generated by future price appreciation from a lower current
price.
If the decomposition is applied to the returns on the investor’s portfolio, these
return components can be interpreted as permanent and transitory shocks to the
investor’s wealth. Returns generated by cash-ﬂow news are never reversed subse-
quently, whereas returns generated by discount-rate news are oﬀset by lower returns
in the future. From this perspective it should not be surprising that conservative
long-term investors are more averse to cash-ﬂow risk than to discount-rate risk.
62.2 VAR methodology
An important issue is how to measure the shocks to cash ﬂows and to discount rates.
One approach, introduced by Campbell (1991), is to estimate the cash-ﬂow-news and
discount-rate-news series using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. This VAR
methodology ﬁrst estimates the terms Et rt+1 and (Et+1−Et)
￿∞
j=1 ρjrt+1+j and then
uses the realization of rt+1 and equation (2) to back out cash-ﬂow news. Because of
the approximate identity linking returns, dividends, and stock prices, this approach
yields results that are almost identical to those that are obtained by forecasting cash
ﬂows explicitly using the same information set, provided that the information set
includes the dividend yield and suﬃcient lags of the forecasting variables. Replacing
the dividend yield with an alternative smooth valuation ratio, such as the smoothed
earnings-price ratio or book-price ratio, also generates similar results whether returns
or cash ﬂows are forecast. Thus the choice of variables to enter the VAR is the
important decision in implementing this methodology.5
When extracting the news terms in our empirical tests, we assume that the data
are generated by a ﬁrst-order VAR model
zt+1 = a +Γ zt + ut+1,( 3 )
where zt+1 is a m-by-1 state vector with rt+1 as its ﬁrst element, a and Γ are m-by-1
vector and m-by-m matrix of constant parameters, and ut+1 an i.i.d. m-by-1 vector
of shocks. Of course, this formulation also allows for higher-order VAR models via a
simple redeﬁnition of the state vector to include lagged values.
Provided that the process in equation (3) generates the data, t+1cash-ﬂow and
discount-rate news are linear functions of the t +1shock vector:
NDR,t+1 = e1
￿λut+1, (4)
NCF,t+1 =( e1
￿ + e1
￿λ)ut+1.
Above, e1 is a vector with ﬁrst element equal to unity and the remaining elements
equal to zeros. The VAR shocks are mapped to news by λ,d e ﬁ n e da sλ ≡ ρΓ(I −
ρΓ)−1.e 1￿λ captures the long-run signiﬁcance of each individual VAR shock to
5Chen and Zhao (2009) discuss the sensitivity of VAR decomposition results to alternative spec-
iﬁcations. Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010), Cochrane (2008), and Engsted, Pedersen, and
Tanggaard (2010) clarify the conditions under which VAR results are robust to the decision whether
to forecast returns or cash ﬂows.
7discount-rate expectations. The greater the absolute value of a variable’s coeﬃ-
cient in the return prediction equation (the top row of Γ), the greater the weight the
variable receives in the discount-rate-news formula. More persistent variables should
also receive more weight, which is captured by the term (I − ρΓ)−1.
2.3 Imposing the ICAPM
Campbell (1993) derives an approximate discrete-time version of Merton’s (1973)
intertemporal CAPM. The model’s central pricing statement is based on the ﬁrst-
order condition for an investor who holds a portfolio p of tradable assets that contains
all of her wealth. Campbell assumes that this portfolio is observable in order to derive
testable asset-pricing implications from the ﬁrst-order condition.
Campbell considers an inﬁnitely lived investor who has the recursive preferences
proposed by Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991), with time discount factor δ,r e l a t i v er i s k
aversion γ, and elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ. Campbell assumes that
all asset returns are conditionally lognormal, and that the investor’s portfolio returns
and its two components are homoskedastic. The assumption of lognormality can be
relaxed if one is willing to use Taylor approximations to the true Euler equations,
and the model can be extended to allow changing variances, something we tackle in
separate work (Campbell, Giglio, Polk and Turley 2011).
Campbell derives an approximate solution in which risk premia depend only on
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ and the discount coeﬃcient ρ,a n dn o td i r e c t l y
on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ. The approximation is accurate if
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is close to one, and it holds exactly in
the limit of continuous time (Schroder and Skiadas 1999) if the elasticity equals one.
In the ψ =1case, ρ = δ and the optimal consumption-wealth ratio is conveniently
constant and equal to 1 − ρ.
Under these assumptions, the optimality of portfolio strategy p requires that the
risk premium on any asset i satisﬁes
Et[ri,t+1] − rf,t+1 +
σ2
i,t
2
= γCovt(ri,t+1,r p,t+1 − Etrp,t+1) (5)
+(1 − γ)Covt(ri,t+1,−Np,DR,t+1),
where p is the optimal portfolio that the agent chooses to hold and Np,DR,t+1 ≡
(Et+1−Et)
￿∞
j=1 ρjrp,t+1+j is discount-rate or expected-return news on this portfolio.
8The left hand side of (5) is the expected excess log return on asset i over the
riskless interest rate, plus one-half the variance of the excess return to adjust for
Jensen’s Inequality. This is the appropriate measure of the risk premium in a log-
normal model. The right hand side of (5) is a weighted average of two covariances:
the covariance of return i with the return on portfolio p, which gets a weight of γ,
and the covariance of return i with negative of news about future expected returns
on portfolio p, which gets a weight of (1 − γ). These two covariances represent the
myopic and intertemporal hedging components of asset demand, respectively. When
γ =1 , it is well known that portfolio choice is myopic and the ﬁrst-order condition
collapses to the familiar one used to derive the pricing implications of the CAPM.
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) rewrite equation (5) to relate the risk premium
to betas with cash-ﬂow news and discount-rate news. Using rp,t+1 − Etrp,t+1 =
Np,CF,t+1 − Np,DR,t+1 to replace the portfolio covariance with news covariances, and
then multiplying and dividing by the conditional variance of portfolio p’s return, σ2
p,t,
we have
Et[ri,t+1] − rf,t+1 +
σ2
i,t
2
= γσ
2
p,tβi,CFp,t + σ
2
p,tβi,DRp,t. (6)
Here the cash-ﬂow beta βi,CF is deﬁned as
βi,CF ≡
Cov(ri,t,N CF,t)
Var
￿
re
M,t − Et−1re
M,t
￿, (7)
and the discount-rate beta βi,DR as
βi,DR ≡
Cov(ri,t,−NDR,t)
Var
￿
re
M,t − Et−1re
M,t
￿. (8)
Note that the discount-rate beta is deﬁned as the covariance of an asset’s return with
good news about the stock market in form of lower-than-expected discount rates, and
that each beta divides by the total variance of unexpected market returns, not the
variance of cash-ﬂow news or discount-rate news separately. These deﬁnitions imply
that the cash-ﬂow beta and the discount-rate beta add up to the total market beta,
βi,M = βi,CF + βi,DR. (9)
Equation (6) delivers the prediction that “bad beta” with cash-ﬂow news should
have a risk price γ times greater than the risk price of “good beta” with discount-rate
news, which should equal the variance of the return on portfolio p.
9In our empirical work, we assume that portfolio p is fully invested in a value-
weighted equity index. This assumption implies that the risk price of discount-rate
news should equal the variance of the value-weighted index. The only free parameter
in equation (6) is then the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, γ.
3D a t a a n d E c o n o m e t r i c s
Our estimation method involves specifying a set of state variables for the VAR, to-
gether with a set of test assets on which we impose the ICAPM conditions. We ﬁrst
describe the data, then our econometric approach for imposing the restrictions of the
asset pricing model.
3.1 VAR data
Our full VAR speciﬁcation includes ﬁve variables, four of which are the same as in
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). Because of data availability issues, we replace the
term yield series used in that paper with a new series, as described below. To those
four variables, we add a default yield spread series. The data are all quarterly, from
1929:2 to 2010:4.
The ﬁrst variable in the VAR is the excess log return on the market, re
M,t h e
diﬀerence between the log return on the Center for Research in Securities Prices
(CRSP) value-weighted stock index and the log risk-free rate. The risk-free data are
constructed by CRSP from Treasury bills with approximately three month maturity.
The second variable is the price-earning ratio (PE)f r o mS h i l l e r( 2 0 0 0 ) ,c o n -
structed as the price of the S&P 500 index divided by a ten-year trailing moving
average of aggregate earnings of companies in the S&P 500 index. Following Graham
and Dodd (1934), Campbell and Shiller (1988b, 1998) advocate averaging earnings
over several years to avoid temporary spikes in the price-earnings ratio caused by
cyclical declines in earnings. We avoid any interpolation of earnings in order to en-
sure that all components of the time-t price-earnings ratio are contemporaneously
observable by time t. The ratio is log transformed. In the Appendix we explore
alternative ways to construct PE and using the price-dividend ratio instead (Tables
11 to 13).
Third, the term yield spread (TY)i so b t a i n e df r o mG l o b a lF i n a n c i a lD a t a .I n
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), TY was computed as the yield diﬀerence between
10ten-year constant-maturity taxable bonds and short-term taxable notes. Since the
series used to construct it were discontinued in 2002, we compute the TY series as
the diﬀerence between the log yield on the 10-Year US Constant Maturity Bond
(IGUSA10D) and the log yield on the 3-Month US Treasury Bill (ITUSA3D).
Fourth, the small-stock value spread (VS)i sc o n s t r u c t e df r o mt h ed a t ao nt h e
six “elementary” equity portfolios made available by Professor Kenneth French on his
web site. These elementary portfolios, which are constructed at the end of each June,
are the intersections of two portfolios formed on size (market equity, ME) and three
portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to market equity (BE/ME). The size
breakpoint for year t is the median NYSE market equity at the end of June of year
t. BE/ME for June of year t is the book equity for the last ﬁscal year end in t − 1
divided by ME for December of t−1. The BE/ME breakpoints are the 30th and 70th
NYSE percentiles.
At the end of June of year t,w ec o n s t r u c tt h es m a l l - s t o c kv a l u es p r e a da st h e
diﬀerence between the log(BE/ME) of the small high-book-to-market portfolio and
the log(BE/ME) of the small low-book-to-market portfolio, where BE and ME are
measured at the end of December of year t − 1. For months from July to May, the
small-stock value spread is constructed by adding the cumulative log return (from
the previous June) on the small low-book-to-market portfolio to, and subtracting the
cumulative log return on the small high-book-to-market portfolio from, the end-of-
June small-stock value spread. The construction of this series follows Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004) closely.
The ﬁfth and last variable in our VAR is the default spread (DEF), deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between the log yield on Moody’s BAA and AAA bonds. The series
is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We add the default spread
to the Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) VAR speciﬁcation partially because that
variable is known to track time-series variation in expected excess returns on the
market portfolio (Fama and French, 1989), but mostly because shocks to the default
spread should to some degree reﬂect news about aggregate default probabilities. Of
course, news about aggregate default probabilities should in turn reﬂect news about
the market’s future cash ﬂows.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on these variables. The lower panel of the
table shows some quite strong correlations among the VAR explanatory variables,
for example a positive correlation of 0.65 between the value spread and the default
spread and a negative correlation of -0.60 between the log price-earnings ratio and
the default spread. These correlations complicate the interpretation of individual
11VAR coeﬃcients when all the variables are included in the VAR.
3.2 Test asset data
Our main set of test assets is the six elementary ME and BE/ME sorted portfolios,
described in the previous section. We price a parsimonious cross section to ensure that
the numerical estimation is manageable and that test asset portfolios are reasonably
diversiﬁed in the early part of the sample. We impose the ICAPM conditions on
the returns of these six assets and on the return of the market portfolio, the CRSP
value-weighted stock index.
All the test portfolios are highly correlated with the market return. When we
estimate the model, we impose the ICAPM equations on the diﬀerence between the
return of each test asset and the return of the market; in this way, we remove part of
the correlation between the errors of the moment conditions, which is computationally
convenient. We also impose, separately, that the model matches the equity premium
exactly.
3.3 Estimation methodology
This section details the estimation technique we use for the restricted model that
jointly imposes time-series and cross-sectional orthogonality conditions in a GMM es-
timation. We use Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron’s (1996) continuously updated (CUE)
GMM as Newey and Smith (2004) highlight the ﬁnite-sample advantages of this
method and other generalised empirical likelihood estimators over standard GMM.
Bansal, Kiku, Shaliastovich, and Yaron (2012) have also recently used a version
of this GMM estimator. However, they employ a simpliﬁed version of the CUE GMM
estimator, in which the covariance of the test-asset returns with the news terms is
taken as known (as opposed to being estimated with error) and the weighting matrix
is obtained by discarding the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix
of moment residuals. In this paper, by contrast, we employ the fully correctly speci-
ﬁed CUE GMM. We preserve the full information content of the variance-covariance
matrix of moment residuals and we take into account all terms that need to be esti-
mated. The price of this is that our estimation method is numerically more involved,
and requires a few additional restrictions to reduce the instability of the estimates,
as described below.
12We use the notation K for the dimension of the VAR and I for the number of
test assets. The restricted model gives us R = K(K+1)+I orthogonality conditions.
K(K +1 )of these estimate the intercepts and dynamic coeﬃcients of the VAR, and
I orthogonality conditions are imposed by the ICAPM on the test assets. There is
one free parameter in the ICAPM, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, so there
are I − 1 overidentifying restrictions.
The VAR restrictions impose, for each equation k,t h a tt h ee r r o ra tt +1is
uncorrelated with each of the state variables measured at time t. They also impose
az e r ou n c o n d i t i o n a lm e a no nt h ei n n o v a t i o nv e c t o r .
The ICAPM conditions are derived as follows. First, we substitute the market
for portfolio p in equation (5), obtaining:
Et[ri,t+1] − rf,t+1 +
σ2
i,t
2
= γCovt(ri,t+1,r m,t+1 − Etrm,t+1) (10)
+(1 − γ)Covt(ri,t+1,−Nm,DR,t+1).
Then, we use the aggregate VAR (which contains the market return) to rewrite:
rm,t+1 − Etrm,t+1 = e1
￿(zt+1 − a − Γzt),
−Nm,DR,t+1 = −NDR,t+1 = −e1
￿λ(zt+1 − a − Γzt),
so that we obtain:
Et[ri,t+1] − rf,t+1 +
σ2
i,t
2
= γCovt(ri,t+1,e1
￿(zt+1 − a − Γzt)) (11)
+(1 − γ)Covt(ri,t+1,−e1
￿λ(zt+1 − a − Γzt)).
Finally, given lognormality, a ﬁrst-order linear approximation around EtRi
t+1 =1
and Rft+1 =1results in6:
Et[ri,t+1] − rf,t+1 +
σ2
i,t
2
￿ Et(Ri,t+1) − Rf,t+1.
Therefore, we can rewrite the asset pricing equation as:
6In particular, lognormality implies Et[ri,t+1]+
σ
2
i,t
2 = ln[Et(Ri,t+1)], and, combining it with the
risk free rate, Et[ri,t+1]+
σ
2
i,t
2 − rf = ln(EtRi,t+1) − ln(Rf,t+1).F o r EtRi
t+1 and Rf,t+1 close to
1, a ﬁrst-order approximation gives ln(EtRi,t+1) − ln(Rf,t+1) ￿ [Et(Rit+1) − 1] − [Rf,t+1 − 1] =
Et(Rit+1) − Rf,t+1.
13Et(Ri,t+1 − Rf,t+1)=γCovt(ri,t+1,e1
￿(zt+1 − a − Γzt))
+(1 − γ)Covt(ri,t+1,−e1
￿λ(zt+1 − a − Γzt)). (12)
We can condition down using the fact that Et[ut+1]=0 ,s ot h a tw eo b t a i n
E(Ri,t+1 − Rf,t+1)=γE(ri,t+1e1
￿(zt+1 − a − Γzt))
−(1 − γ)E(ri,t+1e1
￿λ(zt+1 − a − Γzt)). (13)
We use this orthogonality condition for the market portfolio, but rewrite the I or-
thogonality conditions for the test assets in excess of the market return, rather than
the riskfree rate:
E[R
i
t+1 −R
M
t+1 −(r
i
t+1 −r
M
t+1)e1
￿(γ −(1−γ)ρΓ(I −ρΓ)
−1)(zt+1 −a−Γzt)] = 0. (14)
This is useful for the numerical estimation because it removes a large amount of the
correlation between the errors of the moment conditions.
When K =5 ,w eh a v eal a r g en u m b e ro fp a r a m e t e r st oe s t i m a t e . W et h e r e -
fore have to impose some restrictions to our continuously updated GMM estimation
procedure in order to achieve convergence to acceptable parameter values for every
subsample, a property that we need for out-of-sample analysis.
First, we impose that our model matches the equity premium, i.e. we use equa-
tion (13) for i = Market as a constraint in our estimation, as opposed to a moment
condition. In theory, we could add this equation as an additional moment condition in
the GMM estimation. However, we ﬁnd that – as the Appendix reports – when we do
so the estimator gives a low enough weight to the market equity premium condition
that we obtain an unreasonably large predicted value for the equity premium. To
prevent this from occurring, in our baseline estimate we impose that equation (13) is
matched exactly for i = Market, and report the case where we add it to the moment
conditions in Appendix Table 5.
We also place an upper bound on the risk aversion coeﬃcient γ at 15. This results
in an estimate that in some subsamples actually hits the bound, while in others it
converges below it. As reported in Appendix Tables 3 and 4, imposing larger bounds
yields similar results, although when the bound is very large the estimate for γ tends
to hit the bound. This makes it diﬃcult to choose a particular value for the bound.
As our baseline case, then, we choose a relatively low bound that yields a reasonable
14value for risk aversion, and such that the estimate lies below the bound. We also
impose a lower bound on γ of one, which is never binding.
Finally, we impose stationarity on the estimated VAR by requiring that the
absolute value of the maximum eigenvalue of the transition matrix Γ is less than or
equal to a value λ<1.W ee x p l o r et h ec a s e sλ =0 .98 and λ =0 .99 and report the
former in Appendix Table 1. Again, results appear to be robust to this choice.
The GMM problem for the restricted model can then be written as follows:
min
￿
1
T
￿
t
gt(a,Γ,γ)
￿￿
VT(a,Γ,γ)
−1
￿
1
T
￿
t
gt(a,Γ,γ)
￿
,
s.t. maxeig Γ ≤ ¯ λ,
1 ≤ γ ≤ 15,
E[R
M
t+1 − R
f
t+1 − r
M
t+1e1
￿(γ − (1 − γ)ρΓ(I − ρΓ)
−1)(zt+1 − a − Γzt)] = 0,
where the vector gt includes the K(K +1)orthogonality conditions for the VAR plus
the cross-sectional conditions for the I size/book to market sorted portfolios, and VT
is the continuously updated variance-covariance matrix of the residuals gt.
In order to deﬁne convergence of the estimator, we use a tolerance level of 1e-5 on
the objective function value (whose order of magnitude is around 1e-2), 1e-4 on the
values of the parameters, 1e-3 on γ,a n d1 e - 4o nt h em a x i m u me i g e n v a l u ec o n s t r a i n t
and on the response to discount rate news shocks.
Finally, since in some cases the search algorithm seems to converge to local min-
ima, we start the estimation from several diﬀerent points, where the VAR parameters
are the unrestricted OLS estimates, while γ varies from 1 to the upper bound. This
method seems to converge well to the global minimum.
4A l t e r n a t i v e V A R E s t i m a t e s
In Tables 2 through 4, we estimate three alternative VAR systems. For comparison
with previous work, we begin in Table 2 with a simple two-variable VAR without
restrictions, including only the market excess return and log price-earnings ratio as
state variables. Then in Tables 3 and 4 we include all ﬁve state variables, ﬁrst
without restrictions and then imposing the restrictions of the ICAPM described in
the previous section.
154.1 Two-variable VAR system
Table 2 reports results that are familiar from previous research using this method-
ology. The upper panel shows that the market return is predicted negatively by
the log price-smoothed earnings ratio (with a partial regression coeﬃcient of -0.046
and a standard error of 0.016), which itself follows a persistent AR(1) process. This
implies that discount rate news is quite volatile and explains most of the variance of
the market return.
One way to see the extent to which discount-rate news is an important component
of the market return is to calculate the coeﬃcients mapping state variable shocks into
news terms, as we do next in the upper panel of Table 2. If we orthogonalize the
state variable shocks, using a Cholesky decomposition with the market return ordered
ﬁrst, the “structural” market return shock gets credit for the movement in the price-
earnings ratio that normally accompanies a market return shock, while the structural
shock to the price-earnings ratio is interpreted as an increase in the price-earnings
ratio without any change in the market return, that is, a negative shock to earnings
with no change in price. The ﬁrst shock has a discount-rate eﬀect that is over four
times larger than its cash-ﬂow eﬀect. The second shock carries both bad cash-ﬂow
news and oﬀsetting good discount-rate news to keep the stock price constant.
Another way to see the importance of discount-rate news is to calculate the
standard deviations of discount-rate and cash-ﬂow news. Discount-rate news is more
than twice as volatile as cash-ﬂow news, consistent with results reported by Campbell
(1991) and others. There is only a weak correlation of 0.13 between the two news
terms.
The lower panel of Table 2 computes the cash-ﬂow and discount-rate betas of
the six ME and BE/ME sorted portfolios, for the full sample, and separately for the
early (1929:2-1963:2) and late (1963:3-2010:4) samples. It also reports an estimate of
the risk-aversion parameter that best ﬁts the cross-sectional asset pricing equations,
and the predicted and realized mean returns of each test asset obtained using that
estimate. The next section discusses these results and compares them with those
obtained using the 5-variable VAR.
We have explored what happens when we impose the restrictions of the ICAPM
via GMM on this two-variable VAR system. The predictability of the market re-
turn from the price-earnings ratio diminishes (the partial regression coeﬃcient is only
30% of its previous value), and therefore the volatility of discount-rate news dimin-
ishes. The estimated system implies that cash-ﬂow and discount-rate news have
16similar volatilities and a large positive correlation; that is, almost all stock market
ﬂuctuations are attributed to a roughly equal mix of the two types of shocks, as if
the market overreacts to cash-ﬂow news. The estimate of risk aversion is a modest
2.1, and the overidentifying restrictions of this model are very strongly rejected.
These unpromising results are driven by the fact that in our full sample, the
value spread is negatively correlated with the price-earnings ratio as shown in Table
1. During the Great Depression, the value spread was wide and the price-earnings
ratio was low, while the postwar period has been characterized by a lower value
spread and a higher average price-earnings ratio. Given this fact, a model that only
includes the price-earnings ratio as a predictor variable implies that value stocks have
high discount-rate betas (since on average they do well when the price-earnings ratio
rises, and this predicts low future stock returns). Since the discount-rate beta has a
low price of risk in the ICAPM, the implied value premium is actually lower than it
would be in the simple CAPM; equivalently, the model implies that value stocks have
a negative CAPM alpha. To mitigate this eﬀect, the restricted model reduces the
predictability of stock returns (but does not eliminate it altogether), and estimates
a relatively low coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, thus a relatively small diﬀerence
between the risk prices for cash-ﬂow and discount-rate betas. The poor ﬁt of the
model to the cross-section of stock returns implies that the ICAPM restrictions can
be statistically rejected.
4.2 Unrestricted ﬁve-variable VAR system
In Table 3 we include all ﬁve state variables in an unrestricted VAR. Consistent
with previous research, the term spread predicts the market return positively while
the value spread predicts it negatively; however, the predictive coeﬃcients on these
variables are not precisely estimated. The default spread has an imprecisely estimated
negative coeﬃcient, probably a symptom of multicollinearity among the explanatory
variables as the default spread and the value spread have a correlation of 0.65 in Table
1. However, though some of the partial regression coeﬃcients in the return regression
are statistically insigniﬁcant, we can reject the null hypothesis that all ﬁve coeﬃcients
are jointly equal to zero.
We ﬁnd that discount-rate news is considerably more volatile than cash-ﬂow
news, just as in the unrestricted two-variable model of Table 2. The volatility of
aggregate cash-ﬂow news is 0.043 while the volatility of discount-rate news is 0.100,
more than twice as large. The correlation between these two components of the
market shock is a relatively small -0.07.
17Following Table 2, the lower panel of Table 3 reports the cash-ﬂow and discount-
rate betas of the six ME and BE/ME sorted portfolios. We ﬁnd here the pattern
pointed out by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). In the early period, value stocks
have both higher cash-ﬂow beta and higher discount-rate beta, and therefore are
overall riskier than growth stocks. In the modern sample, they have (slightly) higher
cash-ﬂow betas, but noticeably lower discount-rate betas. These facts account for the
failure of the CAPM in the modern sample. We can contrast these results with those
in Table 2, which shows that the 2-variable VAR is not rich enough to capture such
patterns in cash ﬂow and discount rate betas across portfolios in the modern sample.
We also compute the implied risk aversion parameter γ obtained by regressing
cross-sectionally the six test assets and the market return on their respective betas,
imposing the constraint that the risk-free rate is the zero-beta rate and that the risk
premium on discount rate news is the variance of the market return (as predicted by
the ICAPM). We obtain an estimate of γ just above 8.
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the predicted and realized excess mean returns
of each test asset in excess of the market return, by analogy with equation (14). The
predicted return is obtained by multiplying the cash-ﬂow and discount-rate betas
presented above with the risk premia estimated in the restricted OLS regression. We
can see that in the full sample, the equity premium is overpredicted slightly (2.2%
per quarter as opposed to the realized value of 1.8%), but the cross section of value
and growth stocks is ﬁt relatively well.
4.3 Restricted ﬁve-variable VAR system
Table 4 reports the restricted ﬁve-variable VAR. The restrictions strengthen the pre-
dictive power of the default spread for the market return, and weaken the predictive
power of the value spread. DEF forecasts the log excess market return, controlling
for the other four variables including the P/E ratio, with a coeﬃcient of -0.034 whose
standard error is 0.024. This result points towards a role for the default spread in
capturing a worsening in earning prospects. This is particularly interesting when
compared with previous research (for example Fama and French (1989)) that ﬁnds
a positive univariate relation between the default spread and expected returns. The
two news terms are now estimated to be more volatile, and negatively correlated,
implying that booms and busts are typically due to cash-ﬂow news overwhelming
discount-rate news or vice versa, but not typically due to an equal mix of both types
of shocks.
18We estimate the coeﬃcient of risk aversion to be around 10. This estimate
is arguably within a reasonable range. In terms of overall model ﬁt, we ﬁnd that
the overidentifying restrictions of the ICAPM are rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance
level. While this rejection indicates that the model we impose is unable to meet
the serious challenge of fully capturing both the time-series and the cross-sectional
dimensions of the data, we argue that useful information can be learned by studying
the properties of the time series that best ﬁt the cross-sectional patterns, through
the lens of the economic model. In fact, as we show in Section 5.2, the restricted
model performs very well in predicting returns out of sample: A formal statistical
test conﬁrms that imposing ICAPM restrictions improves out-of-sample predictability.
Thus, while statistically rejected in sample, the economic restrictions imposed through
the ICAPM contain valuable information about asset prices.
Shocks to the default spread play a much more signiﬁcant role in the determi-
nation of cash-ﬂow news in the restricted VAR relative to the unrestricted estimates.
For the reduced-form mapping, the coeﬃcient on the default spread is now -0.28,
compared to the unrestricted estimate of -0.06. For the structural mapping, the co-
eﬃcient on the default spread is -0.06 instead of -0.01. In other words, the restricted
VAR interprets a widening default spread as a sign of deteriorating proﬁt prospects
at the aggregate level, and explains the value premium in part as the result of the
sensitivity of value stock returns to surprise increases in the default spread. This
ﬁnding seems reasonable, given the result in Fama and French (1993) that both small
stocks and value stocks covary more with a default risk factor than large stocks and
growth stocks do. Of course, unlike Fama and French, we restrict the price of risk
for exposure to this factor to be consistent with the ICAPM.
Interestingly, though the key variable of Campbell and Vuolteenaho, the small-
stock value spread, continues to be an important component of market news, its
role does not seem as critical in our structured econometric approach. This helps to
address concerns about the sensitivity of the results in Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004) and Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010) to the inclusion of the small-stock
value spread. In Appendix Table 8, we can see that dropping VS from the restricted
ﬁve-variable VAR has little eﬀect on the qualitative conclusions drawn from the VAR:
the news terms are (even more) strongly negatively correlated and very volatile, and
the default spread similarly becomes extremely important for predicting returns. The
discount-rate and cash-ﬂow news terms appear very similar in the restricted four- and
ﬁve-variable VAR systems.
The lower panel of Table 4 shows that the patterns of cash-ﬂow and discount-
rate betas across the test assets appear reinforced in the restricted VAR. It is clear
19that imposing the ICAPM model on the test assets aﬀects the news terms in a way
that strongly emphasizes a higher exposure of value stocks to cash ﬂow news and
a lower exposure to discount rate news. The errors in the moment conditions are
slightly larger than in the unrestricted case, and concentrated in large stocks. Note
that we impose that equation (13) holds exactly for the market portfolio. However,
we compute our predicted values for the excess returns by calculating the two betas
and using those together with γ to arrive to a predicted value for the equity premium
(which corresponds to using the right-hand side of equation (12)). In theory, equations
(13) and (12) are completely equivalent. However, there will be small diﬀerences
between the two when the orthogonality conditions of the VAR are not matched
exactly, so that the assumptions needed to condition down the covariances are not
fully satisﬁed in the sample. In Appendix Table 4, we show that the results hold
essentially unchanged if we impose the restriction of the GMM estimation in terms
of equation (12) directly.
4.4 Robustness of the estimates
The online Appendix to this paper examines the robustness of these estimates to
variations in the methodology and the set of variables employed.
First, in Appendix Table 1 we impose a slightly tighter bound on the maximum
eigenvalue of the transition matrix Γ.S e c o n d , a s d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , w e r u n o u r e s t i -
mator imposing diﬀerent upper bounds on risk aversion γ. The results are reported
in Appendix Tables 2 (γ ≤ 50)a n d3( γ ≤ 200). Third, in Appendix Table 4 we
impose the restriction on the equity premium in the form of equation (12), i.e. using
covariances, as opposed to expectations. Fourth, we impose the restriction on the
equity premium as a moment condition rather than as a constraint in the estima-
tion; the results are reported in Appendix Table 5. Fifth, we allow the cash-ﬂow
and discount-rate beta estimates of the test assets to diﬀer across the pre-1963 and
the post-1963 subperiods. In particular, in Appendix Table 6 we impose separately
the moment conditions for the six test assets for the early and late sample, therefore
imposing that the mean excess returns are matched separately in both subsamples.
In Appendix Table 7 we also impose that the equity premium is matched separately
in the two subsamples.
We next investigate how the results depend on the variables included in the VAR.
We run our estimation using the log price-dividend ratio instead of the log price-
earnings ratio in Appendix Table 8. Appendix Table 9 estimates the VAR without
20the value spread, while Appendix Table 10 drops the default spread. Appendix Table
11 uses the aggregate book-to-market ratio of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms7. The results show
that the decomposition of the two stock market episodes is not due to ﬁnancial ﬁrms
in particular, but reﬂects economy-wide news. We use the book-to-market ratio of
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms instead of the price-earnings ratio because we can then integrate
Compustat data with Ken French’s Historical Book Equity Data, to obtain a series
that extends back to the 1920s.
Appendix Tables 12 and 13 report the unrestricted and restricted estimates ob-
tained adding CAY (Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)) to the VAR. CAY is a powerful
predictor of returns and as such can help us better identify discount rate news. How-
ever, CAY is only available from 1952, so that we lose the information contained in
the period of the Great Depression. Appendix Tables 14 and 15 report the estimates
from the baseline model obtained in the same subsample in which CAY is available.
In Appendix Tables 16 to 18 we explore diﬀerent ways to construct the price-
earnings ratio. In particular, in Table 16 we construct the ratio by deﬂating both
the price and the earnings series by the CPI before taking their ratio. In Table 17,
we construct the price-earnings ratio as in the preceding table, but we add inﬂation,
exponentially smoothed with a three-year half-life, to the set of variables in the VAR.
In Table 18, we use the short-term nominal rate to deﬂate the two series, to address
concerns that the CPI is poorly measured in the early sample.
In Appendix Table 19 we run the estimation using as a ﬁrst variable in the
VAR the real return on the market portfolio as opposed to the excess return. This
speciﬁcation undoes a modelling choice of Campbell and Vuolteenaho, who forecast
excess returns out of concern that the CPI was poorly measured in the ﬁrst part of
the sample period, at the cost of combining cash-ﬂow news with real-interest-rate
news.
While the estimation results vary across these diﬀerent speciﬁcations, all of the
main qualitative patterns turn out to be very robust. First, the restricted news terms
always appear more volatile than the ones implied by the unrestricted estimator and,
more importantly, they always appear negatively correlated. Therefore, a robust
feature of our results is that imposing the cross-sectional restrictions leads us to de-
compose stock market movements into either cash-ﬂow or discount-rate news, rather
than a mix of the two. Second, across almost all of the restricted speciﬁcations, move-
ments in the PE ratio predict future returns more weakly than in the unrestricted
7We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion of looking at a valuation ratio that excludes
ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
21speciﬁcations. Third, the default spread becomes in most speciﬁcations more impor-
tant as a predictor of future returns, and appears, as in the baseline estimate, with a
negative coeﬃcient. Fourth, the pattern of cash-ﬂow and discount-rate betas for value
and growth stocks is very robust across speciﬁcations for the modern period, just as
in our baseline restricted estimates. In almost all robustness tests, value stocks have
in the modern sample higher cash-ﬂow beta and lower discount-rate beta. In fact, in
some speciﬁcations this pattern holds even in the early sample, where the standard
CAPM would work reasonably well. Taken together, these patterns are the main
features that drive our interpretation of the results, discussed in the next section.
5U n d e r s t a n d i n g R e c e n t U S F i n a n c i a l H i s t o r y
5.1 The VAR approach
What account do these alternative VAR models give of US ﬁnancial history? In Figure
1, we report exponentially smoothed news series over the full sample period from
1929:2 through 2010:4. The smoothing parameter is 0.08 per quarter, corresponding
to a half-life of approximately two years. Our three models are organized vertically,
in each case with cash-ﬂow news on the left and the negative of discount-rate news on
the right. Increases in each news series imply an increase in stock prices driven by
cash-ﬂow or discount-rate changes. For each model, the two smoothed news series
sum to the smoothed unexpected excess return on the stock market, which varies
somewhat across models since diﬀerent models imply diﬀerent expected returns.
The three models give a fairly similar explanation of the large movements in the
stock market over this eighty-year period. The Great Depression was a prolonged
period of negative cash-ﬂow news that lasted until World War II, together with a
sharp increase in discount rates—equivalently, a decline in investor sentiment—in the
very early 1930’s. This was followed by a proﬁt boom in the late 1940’s through to
the early 1960’s, but discount rates remained high in this period (sentiment remained
depressed), dampening the eﬀect on stock prices. Proﬁts were weak in the 1980’s
and early 1990’s, and stronger if somewhat erratic during the last two decades of the
sample. Declining discount rates (improving sentiment) drove stock prices up from
the late 1970’s through the year 2000.
In Figure 2, we look more closely at the period since 1995. All three models show
that declining discount rates (improving sentiment) drove the stock market up during
22the late 1990’s, and then reversed in the early 2000’s. All three models also show
a proﬁt boom in the mid-2000’s followed by a collapse in 2007-08. The restricted
model shows a particularly strong hump shape in cash-ﬂow news over this period.
Note that since the restricted model predicts a very sharp decomposition between
discount rate and cash ﬂow news, the large negative shock that follows the bust of
the tech episode is accompanied by a positive cash ﬂow news that compensates its
eﬀect on the return. Therefore, in the restricted model the cash-ﬂow boom of the
2000s appears earlier than in the unrestricted model, but this is mostly due to the
large negative discount rate shock of 2001.
There is less consistency across models about cash-ﬂow news in the 1990’s, which
is estimated to be modestly positive in the two-variable model but not in the ﬁve-
variable models. The models also give diﬀerent accounts of the trough of the crisis in
the fall of 2008 and the subsequent recovery. The unrestricted models interpret the
sharp decline in the price-earnings ratio in late 2008 as a piece of negative discount-
rate news; they say that investor sentiment, which had remained modestly positive
over the previous four years, collapsed at that point and recovered in 2009.
The restricted model, on the other hand, attributes the stock market decline in
the fall of 2008 to the arrival of extremely bad cash-ﬂow news, oﬀset to some degree
by declining discount rates. This interpretation results from the emphasis placed by
the restricted model on the default spread, which widened dramatically in the fall of
2008. Between 2008 and 2009 the spike in the default spread reversed, from about
3.16% to just above 1%. Given the importance of the default spread in the restricted
model, this implies that the restricted estimates of the model show a much stronger
rebound in cash ﬂow news, i.e. much stronger good news for long-term investors,
after the sharp decline in 2008.8
Summarizing these results, our VAR models tell us that the two boom-bust
cycles of the 1990’s and the 2000’s were quite diﬀerent in their proximate causes.
8This result has also strong implications for consumption growth. Simple algebra shows that the
consumption growth process in this model follows:
∆ct+1 − Et∆ct+1 =( rt+1 − Etrt+1) − (ψ − 1)NDR,t+1
which can be plotted over time for diﬀerent values of ψ (recall that ψ is not pinned down by asset
prices, so we cannot estimate it using our VAR and test asset data). Appendix Figure 1 shows results
for ψ =0 .5,1,1.5. In all cases, a strong consumption recovery follows the ﬁnancial crisis. Given
that the restricted model ﬁnds more good news coming from NCF (and consequently relatively less
good news from −NDR), the rebound in consumption in 2009 is stronger under the restricted model
for ψ<1,w e a k e rf o rψ>1,a n da p p r o x i m a t e l yt h es a m ea st h eu n r e s t r i c t e dm o d e lf o rψ =1 .
23The technology boom and bust that occurred in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s was
primarily driven by discount-rate news. The credit boom and bust of the mid to late
2000’s saw an extended proﬁt boom followed by negative cash-ﬂow news at the onset
of the ﬁnancial crisis. Discount rates remained low, contributing to high stock prices
during the boom, and did not drive stock prices down until late 2008 at the earliest.
5.2 Robustness of the return decomposition
To illustrate the robustness of the main results to the speciﬁcation of the VAR, Ap-
pendix Figures 2 and 3 reproduce Figure 2 of the text using diﬀerent sets of variables
for the VAR. Only the 5-variable unrestricted and restricted results are plotted. Ap-
pendix Figure 2 compares the baseline estimate from Figure 2 with estimates obtained
using PD instead of PE, dropping VS, dropping DEF, and using the aggregate book-
to-market ratio of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. The ﬁgure shows that the main features of the
return decomposition into cash-ﬂow and discount-rate news for the last two stock
market cycles are similar in all cases.
Appendix Figure 3 plots the results obtained by adding CAY to the VAR. Once
again, the unrestricted estimates conﬁrm the main decomposition of the technology
and credit boom-bust cycles. The restricted news terms, however, are very noisy.
To further investigate this, we compute and plot in Appendix Figure 2 the baseline
VAR (without CAY) using the same sample used to compute the results with CAY,
starting in 1952. The resulting news terms, denoted “later sample”, are also quite
noisy. This shows that what makes the restricted estimated news terms so noisy is
using the shorter sample for which CAY is available, not the addition of CAY per
se. We believe this is a downside of using CUE GMM, which is known to sometimes
result in extreme estimates (see Hansen, Heaton and Yaron (1996)), even though it
has generally good small-sample properties.
5.3 Out-of-sample return forecasts
Another way to understand the diﬀerences between the technology and credit boom-
bust cycles is to use our three VAR models to generate out-of-sample return forecasts
during the period 1994–2010. We estimate each model on an expanding sample and,
in Figure 3, plot the resulting out-of-sample forecasts and the realized returns.
The striking pattern in Figure 3 is that return forecasts were considerably lower
during the boom of the late 1990’s than they were during the boom of the mid-2000’s,
24and they increased more strongly and rapidly during the downturn following the year
2000 than they did in 2007-08. Only at the very end of 2008 and in 2009 did return
forecasts increase meaningfully. These diﬀerences are noticeable in all the models, but
are stronger in the ﬁve-variable models than in the two-variable model, and strongest
in the ﬁve-variable model with theoretical restrictions imposed. The implication
is that the stock market downturn of the early 2000’s was mitigated, for long-term
investors, by an increase in expected future stock returns. This was much less the
case in 2007-08.
To compare the out-of-sample performance of our restricted and unrestricted
models we employ the methodology of Clark and West (2006, 2007). Our restricted
model is nested in the unrestricted model: in population, the predictions of the unre-
stricted model are the same as those of the restricted model if the ICAPM restrictions
are correct. In cases such as these, the commonly used Diebold and Mariano (1995)
statistic to compare out-of-sample mean squared prediction errors (MSPE) has a non-
standard limiting distribution. As Clark and West (2006) point out, under the null
hypothesis that the restrictions are true, we should expect a better MSPE for the re-
stricted model, since the restrictions imply a gain in estimation eﬃciency. The MSPE
diﬀerence statistic is not centered at zero, and the test should take this into account.
In addition, the asymptotic distribution of the statistic is in general not normal.
Clark and West (2007) present simulation-based evidence that applying standard
critical values to a suitably adjusted MSPE diﬀerence statistic produces an approxi-
mately correctly sized test. We follow their suggested approach. The diﬀerence in
the MSPE of the ﬁve-variable restricted model relative to the unrestricted model is
-0.0008, so the restricted model performs better out-of-sample than the unrestricted
model. The adjusted MSPE diﬀerence of Clark and West is -0.0001, with a t-statistic
of -0.18. The results presented by Clark and West (2007) suggest that one should
reject the restricted model at a 10% conﬁdence level if the t-statistic of the adjusted
MSPE is higher than 1.28, that is, if the restricted model performs suﬃciently worse
than the unrestricted model after penalizing the restricted model for the expected
gain in eﬃciency under the null hypothesis. In our case, the restricted model im-
proves the MSPE in line with what we would expect if the restrictions were true (the
t-statistic is close to zero), and therefore we do not reject our ICAPM model. This
conﬁrms that imposing ICAPM restrictions can indeed improve estimation eﬃciency
and out-of-sample predictive power.
255.4 Recent booms and busts in event time
The diﬀerences between the technology and credit booms and busts can be appreci-
ated without using VAR methodology. Figure 4 plots several key aggregate inputs
to our analysis. To aid comparison of the technology and credit episodes, we plot
variables in event time, where the event is the stock market peak: 2000:1 for the
technology boom, and 2007:3 for the credit boom. The horizontal axis is labelled in
years relative to the market peak, and vertical lines are drawn every half year (two
quarters).
One can see from Figure 4 that though, by construction, returns increased leading
up to the peak and then decreased, there are clear diﬀerences in the source of that
variation across these two key episodes in recent market history. For the tech boom,
the PE ratio increased considerably during the time leading up to the peak, while
during the credit boom, the market’s PE was essentially ﬂat. Since Campbell and
Shiller (1988b) and others document that discount-rate news dominates cash-ﬂow
news in moving the ratios of prices to accounting measures of stock market value,
movements in PEshould be thought of as reﬂecting good news about market discount
rates. In contrast, the market’s smoothed earnings (E)g r e ws t r o n g l yd u r i n gt h ey e a r s
of the credit boom, while during the tech boom there was a much smaller increase in
E.I n f a c t , a n y i n c r e a s e i n E prior to the tech peak occurred entirely within a year
of the market top. Of course, movements in this variable are naturally associated
with market cash-ﬂow news.
Post event, the plots show that PE moved dramatically downward for both
the tech and credit busts. However, during the credit bust this movement in PE
is associated with a strong downward movement in E, while during the tech bust,
aggregate earnings actually increased in the ﬁrst three quarters after the market peak,
and only then started to decline. Similar conclusions can be drawn from examining
the price-to-dividend ratio, PD,a n dt h a tr a t i o ’ sc a s h - ﬂ o wc o m p o n e n t ,d i v i d e n d so v e r
the last year (D). Movements in PD are very similar to movements in PE. Prices
scaled by dividends rise and then fall around the tech boom. However D is essentially
ﬂat during the six years surrounding this episode. In stark contrast, D rises sharply
throughout the three years preceding the credit boom and then begins to taper oﬀ in
the months subsequent to the peak. The slowdown in the growth of D corresponds
with a rapid decline in the PD ratio. These movements in simple aggregates are
consistent with our claim that the tech boom and bust was primarily a discount-rate
event (followed by a negative cash ﬂow shock with some delay) while the credit boom
and bust was primarily a cash-ﬂow event.
26Figure 4 also conﬁrms the usefulness of examining the cross-section of asset
returns for information about market aggregates. In particular, the movement in the
value spread shows a striking diﬀerence across the two periods. During the tech boom,
VSincreases leading up to the market peak and then after the peak starts to decline,
though this decline does take over a year to begin. In stark contrast, the VSdecreases
in the time leading up to the credit peak and then begins to rise sharply after the
market begins to decline in late 2007. This response is exactly what one would expect
if cross-sectional pricing followed the ICAPM of Merton (1973), Campbell (1996),
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), and Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010).
Speciﬁcally, the price gap between expensive and cheap stocks should narrow during
times when shocks to market cash-ﬂow news are positive or when shocks to market
discount-rate news are negative. Conversely, this price gap should widen during times
when shocks to market cash-ﬂow news are negative or when shocks to market discount-
rate news are positive. We ﬁnd it comforting that this straightforward prediction of
the ICAPM can be seen clearly in the data, indicating that our conclusions do not
hinge on the details of a VAR speciﬁcation.
When we do estimate a VAR imposing the restrictions of the ICAPM, the re-
stricted system places greater emphasis on movements in the default spread. Figure
4 shows that the default spread was relatively stable during the tech boom and bust,
but spiked upwards in late 2008 and early 2009, between one and two years after the
market peak. This increase in the default spread, together with the simultaneous
collapse in smoothed earnings also visible in Figure 4, accounts for the fact that the
restricted VAR system perceives highly negative cash-ﬂow news in the fall of 2008 as
shown at the bottom right of the ﬁgure. Because cash-ﬂow news and discount-rate
news are negatively correlated in the restricted model, the restricted VAR estimate
of discount-rate news is positive in the same period, illustrated in the bottom left of
the ﬁgure.
These observations apply as well to the various robustness tests reported in the
Appendix. Both the strong negative correlation of cash ﬂow and discount rate news,
and the strong negative predictive power of DEF for future cash ﬂows (or VS in
some cases), imply that the recent credit episode is mainly explained by cash ﬂow
news. Similarly, the large movements in PE imply a dominant discount rate news
component for the tech boom and bust across all speciﬁcations.
275.5 Other macroeconomic evidence
The contrast between the technology and credit booms and busts is also visible in
other macroeconomic time series not included in our VAR analysis. Figure 5 shows
several of these series, reported in event time around the two peaks. The top left panel
reports the smoothed excess return on the market. Then, we report several measures
of real activity, namely the seasonally adjusted logs of industrial production (IP),
vehicle miles travelled in the US (VMT), the Ceridian-UCLA Pulse of Commerce
Index based on diesel fuel consumption in the US trucking industry (PC). All of
these series show much greater declines in the credit bust than in the technology
bust. We also show NIPA proﬁts, which do not include capital gains and losses, and
highlight the real nature of the credit bust (and successive recovery). Next, the graph
of the 10-year GDP forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters shows the
very diﬀerent nature of the two episodes not only in terms of current activity, but also
in terms of expectations about the future. Finally, we report the logs of business and
nonbusiness bankruptcies. Both types of bankruptcy decline sharply in 2006 with a
change in US bankruptcy law, but were ﬂat during the technology bust and rapidly
increasing during the credit bust.
Given that these time series are not visible to our VAR systems, it is striking
how they conﬁrm our VAR ﬁnding, one version of which (the unrestricted ﬁve-variable
system) is recapitulated in the bottom two panels of the ﬁgure, that cash-ﬂow news
plays a greater role in the credit bust than in the technology bust.
Finally, we note that two other recent papers, Cochrane (2011) and Lettau and
Ludvigson (2011), have used movements in aggregate consumption to analyze recent
stock market ﬂuctuations. Cochrane’s Figure 9 shows that aggregate consumption
declined far more dramatically in the credit bust than in the technology bust. This
is what one would expect if consumers are forward-looking, have a low intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution, and perceived increasing rates of return on equity
investments in the technology bust but not in the credit bust. Lettau and Ludvig-
son use cointegration analysis of consumption and wealth to argue that temporary
wealth shocks drove down stock prices in 2000-02, while both temporary and perma-
nent shocks were important in 2007-09. Their ﬁnding, while obtained using a very
diﬀerent methodology, is consistent with ours.
286B o o m s a n d B u s t s D u r i n g t h e L a s t C e n t u r y
This analysis can be extended to all booms and busts in the stock market for the last
century, in the spirit of Burns and Mitchell (1946) and Blanchard and Watson (1986).
We start by designing a simple algorithm to detect boom-bust episodes and their
peaks from the time series of log real market returns. After removing a linear trend,
we identify quarters that are part of a downturn in the S&P if any of the following
conditions is met: the quarter is followed by a cumulative decline of 30% in 6 quarters,
or 25% in 4 quarters, or 20% in 2 quarters; this allows us to capture episodes in which
the declines occur in diﬀerent time frames. We then identify “episodes” by grouping
together quarters that are deemed to be part of a downturn, as long as they are not
more than two quarters apart from each other. The peak of the episode will then be
the quarter of each group with the highest value of the S&P. Finally, we consider only
episodes that include at least 2 quarters of downturn.
Proceeding in this way, we identify 12 episodes, with peaks in 1929:3, 1937:1,
1940:1, 1946:2, 1956:1, 1961:4, 1968:4, 1972:4, 1980:4, 1987:3, 2000:1, 2007:3. Figure
6 plots real cumulative log returns (ﬁrst panel); log E and P/E (second panel); log
default and value spread (smoothed, third panel); Ncf and negative Ndr (smoothed,
last panel) from 1929:2 to 2010:4 together with two-year intervals centered around
each peak. Figure 6a shows the period 1929–65, while Figure 6b shows the period
1970–2010. Shaded areas correspond to NBER recessions.
Looking at the history of the S&P, we can classify boom-bust episodes into three
categories. First, we have “hard times”: episodes driven mainly by cash-ﬂow news.
In these cases, large negative movements in cash ﬂow news are accompanied by large
drops in earnings, a widening of the default spread and of the value spread. NBER
recessions start almost immediately after the stock market begins to drop. Besides
the recent credit episode, this group includes the downturns of 1929 and 1937.
Second, we can identify a few “pure sentiment” episodes, in which we observe
sharp increases and drops in the market driven almost exclusively by discount-rate
news. During these periods, we do not observe large increases in the default spread
and value spread (which may instead be decreasing). These episodes are not followed
by an NBER recession in the next few years. Pure sentiment episodes are the 1987
market crash, as well as the downturns in 1946, immediately after the end of World
War II, and in 1961.
Finally, the other episodes (concentrated between 1955 and 2002, including the
technology boom-bust period) are primarily - but not exclusively - driven by senti-
29ment. They feature stable or growing earnings during the boom, and the downturn
is driven mostly by discount rate shocks. Cash-ﬂow shocks reinforce the downturn,
but with a delay of several quarters. NBER recessions usually follow the sentiment
shock with a lag of 9 to 18 months.
Hard times, then, are not new to the recent crisis. Sharp drops in the stock
market driven primarily by cash ﬂow news have been observed in particularly bad
times: the Great Depression and the period immediately before World War II. Most
boom-bust episodes in the stock market in the last century, however, can be attributed
to sentiment shocks (alone or accompanied by delayed, and less severe, cash ﬂow
shocks) – much more bearable for long-term investors.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Over the last three decades, ﬁnancial economists have dramatically changed their
interpretation of stock market movements. A wave of research has challenged the
traditional paradigm in which the equity premium is constant, excess stock returns
are unforecastable, and stock price ﬂuctuations solely reﬂect news about corporate
proﬁts. Although there is still an active debate about the extent of predictability in
stock returns (see for example Campbell and Thompson 2008, Cochrane 2008, and
Goyal and Welch 2008), many ﬁnancial economists have adopted a new paradigm
in which a signiﬁcant fraction of the variation in market returns reﬂects information
about future expected returns.
The new paradigm implies that market returns are a very noisy proxy for cor-
porate fundamentals. Market returns often reﬂect temporary valuation movements
instead of shifts in aggregate proﬁtability, so it is diﬃcult to learn about changes in
corporate fundamentals simply from raw realized returns.
We turn to asset pricing theory to provide a better understanding of the fun-
damentals hidden in stock market returns than can be achieved by purely statistical
methods. In particular, we use the theoretical restrictions of the ICAPM to jointly es-
timate both a time-series model for the aggregate market return and a cross-sectional
model of average stock returns using GMM. Though the test of overidentifying re-
strictions statistically rejects our joint model, we argue that the economic theory we
exploit, the ICAPM, contains valuable information that can improve estimation of
time variation in the equity premium. Indeed, out-of-sample tests conﬁrm the use-
fulness of our theory-driven approach. Naturally, other approaches, for example a
30Bayesian framework, could be used to incorporate theoretical restrictions in the esti-
mation. We do not pursue the Bayesian approach in our paper, but we are conﬁdent
that in that framework the theoretical restrictions would aﬀect the estimated news
terms in a very similar direction to the one we obtain, yielding qualitatively similar
results.
Our analysis implies that bad news about future corporate proﬁts was much more
important in the stock market downturn of 2007–2009 than in the previous downturn
of 2000-2002. The earlier downturn was driven primarily by a large increase in ex-
pected future stock returns. Although the 2007–2009 proportional decline in stock
prices was only slightly greater than the 2000–2002 decline, it had more serious im-
plications for long-term rational investors, because there was a smaller increase in
expected future returns to reassure investors that stock prices were likely to recover
over time. Our model implies that high returns in late 2009 and 2010 reﬂect unex-
pected positive shocks. In this sense, times were particularly hard at the bottom of
the recent downturn in March 2009.
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34Figure Descriptions
Figure 1: This ﬁgure plots the cash-ﬂow news and the negative of discount-
rate news, smoothed with a trailing exponentially-weighted moving average. Each
row of graphs plots news terms extracted from the corresponding VARs estimated in
Tables 2 through 4 respectively. The decay parameter is set to 0.08 per quarter, and
the smoothed news series are generated as MAt(N)=0.08Nt+(1-0.08)MAt−1(N). The
sample period is 1929:2-2010:4.
Figure 2: This ﬁgure plots the cash-ﬂow news and the negative of discount-
rate news, smoothed with a trailing exponentially-weighted moving average. Each
row of graphs plots news terms extracted from the corresponding VARs estimated in
Tables 2 through 4 respectively. The decay parameter is set to 0.08 per quarter, and
the smoothed news series are generated as MAt(N)=0.08Nt+(1-0.08)MAt−1(N). The
sample period is 1995:1-2010:4.
Figure 3: This ﬁgure plots the 1993-2010 out-of-sample equity premium fore-
casting performance of the VARs estimated in Tables 2 through 4. The models are
estimated on a expanding window basis and then used to predict quarterly excess
log returns on the CRSP value-weight index. For comparison, we also plot realized
excess equity returns.
Figure 4: This ﬁgure plots the evolution in event time for the key aggregate
variables in our analysis for both the tech boom of 1997-2002 and the credit boom
of 2005-2010. The event for each period is the market peak (tech: 2000:1, credit:
2007:3). The variables we plot include the excess return on the market, the small
stock value spread (VS), the default yield spread (DEF), the price-earnings ratio
(PE), the market’s smoothed earnings (E), the price-to-dividend ratio (PD), and the
market’s smoothed dividends (D). Excess returns, VS and DEF are exponentially
smoothed with decay 0.08.
Figure 5: This ﬁgure plots the evolution in event time for several macroeconomic
variables for both the tech boom of 1997-2002 and the credit boom of 2005-2010. The
event for each period is the market peak (tech: 2000:1, credit: 2007:3). The variables
we plot include the smoothed excess return on the market, the seasonally adjusted logs
of industrial production (IP), vehicle miles travelled in the US (VMT), the Ceridian-
UCLA Pulse of Commerce Index based on diesel fuel consumption in the US trucking
industry (PC), the log NIPA proﬁts, the 10-year GDP Forecast from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters, and the log of business and nonbusiness bankruptcies.
35Figure 6: This ﬁgure plots excess returns, log E, log PE, the log default spread
and value spread, together with Ncf and Ndr from the 5-variable unrestricted model
between 1929 and 2010. Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions. Boxes are centered
around market peaks and include 2 years before and after each peak. Figure 6a
shows the period 1929–65, while Figure 6b shows the period 1970–2010. Shaded
areas correspond to NBER recessions.
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ïNdrVariable  Mean  Median  Std.  Min  Max 
Rm 0.012 0.027 0.108 -0.439 0.639
PE  2.923 2.916 0.384 1.508 3.910
TY  1.459 1.419 1.050 -1.650 3.748
VS  1.639 1.509 0.362 1.180 2.685
DEF  1.078 0.847 0.685 0.324 5.167
Correlations Rm-Rf PE TY VS DEF
Rm 1.000 0.077 0.051 -0.036 -0.168
PE  0.077 1.000 -0.240 -0.368 -0.601
TY  0.051 -0.240 1.000 0.321 0.402
VS  -0.036 -0.368 0.321 1.000 0.650
DEF  -0.168 -0.601 0.402 0.650 1.000
Note: The table reports the descriptive statistics of the VAR state variables over the full sample period
1929:2-2010:4, 327 quarterly data points. Rm is the excess log return on the CRSP value-weighted
index. PE is the log ratio of the S&P 500's price to the S&P 500's ten-year moving average of
earnings. TY is the term yield spread in percentage points, measured as the yield difference between
the log yield on the ten-year US constant maturity bond and the log yield on the three-month US
treasury. VS is the small-stock value-spread, the difference in the log book-to-market ratios of small
value and small growth stocks. The small-value and small-growth portfolios are two of the six
elementary portfolios constructed by Davis et al. (2000). DEF is the default yield spread in percentage
points between the log yield on Moody's BAA and AAA bonds.
Table 1: Descriptive StatisticsVAR estimate Rm PE R squared
Rm -0.011 -0.046 0.027
(0.055) (0.016)
PE 0.061 0.963 0.932
(0.051) (0.015)
Error to Ncf 0.938 -0.873
Error to -Ndr 0.062 0.873
Structural Error to Ncf 0.020 -0.036
Structural Error to -Ndr 0.087 0.036
News terms corr/std Ncf -Ndr Gamma
Ncf 0.041 0.133 6.557
-Ndr 0.133 0.094
Betas
Growth Neutral Value Growth Neutral Value
Cash Flow 0.262 0.227 0.230 0.181 0.173 0.203
Discount Rate 1.079 1.004 1.109 0.775 0.828 0.985
E[Rm-Rf]
Predicted 0.009 0.005 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.023
Realized 0.006 0.015 0.022 -0.002 0.002 0.011 0.018
Error -0.002 0.010 0.015 -0.001 0.003 0.008 -0.005
Betas (early sample)
Growth Neutral Value Growth Neutral Value
Cash Flow 0.228 0.231 0.251 0.166 0.177 0.243
Discount Rate 1.088 1.096 1.273 0.775 0.939 1.163
E[Rm-Rf]
Predicted 0.009 0.010 0.015 -0.003 0.001 0.012 0.034
Realized 0.013 0.016 0.026 -0.002 0.004 0.017 0.025
Error 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.009
Betas (late sample)
Growth Neutral Value Growth Neutral Value
Cash Flow 0.317 0.225 0.200 0.208 0.170 0.144
Discount Rate 1.073 0.859 0.850 0.776 0.655 0.709
E[Rm-Rf]
Predicted 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.016
Realized 0.002 0.014 0.019 -0.001 0.001 0.006 0.013
Error -0.007 0.012 0.018 -0.001 0.003 0.009 -0.003
Large
E[Ri-Rm]
Small Large
E[Ri-Rm]
Note: The table shows the results obtained with a first-order VAR model including a constant, the log excess market return (Rm)
and the price-earnings ratio (PE). The upper panel reports the estimates of the transition matrix of the VAR (standard errors in
parentheses) and the R2 of each regression. It also reports the coefficients mapping state variable shocks into news terms for
both a reduced-form VAR and a structural VAR where Rm is ordered first and PE second. Finally, the upper panel reports the
correlation matrix of the shocks with shock standard deviations on the diagonal, and the risk aversion parameter Gamma implied
by the ICAPM model estimated as in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) using the six size/book to market sorted portfolios. The
lower panel reports cash flow and discont rate news betas for the six portfolios, the predicted and realized mean return of each
portfolio in excess of the market, as well as the equity premium. Betas and excess returns are reported for the full sample
(1929:2-2010:4) as well as for the early (1929:2-1963:2) and late (1963:3-2010:4) subsamples.
Table 2 - Unrestricted VAR estimate, 2 variables
Small Large
E[Ri-Rm]
SmallVAR estimate Rm PE TY VS DEF R squared
Rm -0.019 -0.057 0.007 -0.033 -0.004 0.040
(0.056) (0.019) (0.006) (0.022) (0.014)
PE 0.059 0.962 0.006 -0.028 0.004 0.933
(0.053) (0.018) (0.006) (0.020) (0.013)
TY 0.114 0.057 0.781 0.023 0.201 0.709
(0.298) (0.102) (0.033) (0.115) (0.074)
VS 0.057 0.007 -0.004 0.952 0.021 0.943
(0.046) (0.016) (0.005) (0.018) (0.011)
DEF -0.278 -0.023 0.007 0.130 0.837 0.817
(0.155) (0.053) (0.017) (0.060) (0.038)
Error to Ncf 0.930 -1.018 0.004 -0.150 -0.055
Error to -Ndr 0.070 1.018 -0.004 0.150 0.055
Structural Error to Ncf 0.015 -0.035 0.002 -0.017 -0.012
Structural Error to -Ndr 0.091 0.035 -0.002 0.017 0.012
News terms corr/std Ncf -Ndr Gamma 8.061
Ncf 0.043 -0.070
-Ndr -0.070 0.100
Betas
Growth Neutral Value Growth Neutral Value
Cash Flow 0.177 0.193 0.230 0.109 0.151 0.208
Discount Rate 1.167 1.041 1.111 0.845 0.849 0.985
E[Rm-Rf]
Predicted 0.007 0.007 0.011 -0.003 0.001 0.008 0.022
Realized 0.006 0.015 0.022 -0.002 0.002 0.011 0.018
Error -0.001 0.007 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.004
Betas (early sample)
Growth Neutral Value Growth Neutral Value
Cash Flow 0.251 0.271 0.323 0.163 0.210 0.308
Discount Rate 1.082 1.075 1.220 0.782 0.915 1.114
E[Rm-Rf]
Predicted 0.011 0.014 0.023 -0.005 0.003 0.020 0.039
Realized 0.013 0.016 0.026 -0.002 0.004 0.017 0.025
Error 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.015
Betas (late sample)
Growth Neutral Value Growth Neutral Value
Cash Flow 0.064 0.077 0.091 0.028 0.062 0.056
Discount Rate 1.297 0.987 0.940 0.939 0.747 0.786
E[Rm-Rf]
Predicted 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.010
Realized 0.002 0.014 0.019 -0.001 0.001 0.006 0.013
Error -0.003 0.011 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.003
Large
E[Ri-Rm]
Note: The table shows the results obtained with a first-order VAR model including a constant, the log excess market return (Rm),
the price-earnings ratio (PE), the term yield spread (TY), the small-stock value spread (VS), and the default yield spread (DEF).
The upper panel reports the estimates of the transition matrix of the VAR (standard errors in parentheses) and the R2 of each
regression. It also reports the coefficients mapping state variable shocks into news terms for both a reduced-form VAR and a
structural VAR where Rm is ordered first and PE second. Finally, the upper panel reports the correlation matrix of the shocks
with shock standard deviations on the diagonal, and the risk aversion parameter Gamma implied by the ICAPM model estimated
as in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) using the six size/book to market sorted portfolios. The lower panel reports cash flow
and discont rate news betas for the six portfolios, the predicted and realized mean return of each portfolio in excess of the
market, as well as the equity premium. Betas and excess returns are reported for the full sample (1929:2-2010:4) as well as for
the early (1929:2-1963:2) and late (1963:3-2010:4) subsamples.
Small
Table 3 - Unrestricted VAR estimate, 5 variables
Large
E[Ri-Rm]
Small Large
E[Ri-Rm]
SmallVAR estimate Rm PE TY VS DEF R squared
Rm 0.100 -0.037 0.005 0.003 -0.034 -0.020
(0.084) (0.017) (0.007) (0.025) (0.024)
PE 0.186 0.990 0.002 0.007 -0.015 0.929
(0.087) (0.015) (0.006) (0.024) (0.023)
TY -0.108 0.037 0.801 0.002 0.191 0.713
(0.301) (0.096) (0.048) (0.111) (0.087)
VS 0.001 0.024 -0.007 0.944 0.040 0.942
(0.066) (0.017) (0.005) (0.017) (0.013)
DEF -0.639 -0.021 -0.013 0.039 0.961 0.803
(0.358) (0.037) (0.017) (0.061) (0.080)
Error to Ncf 0.985 -1.542 0.037 -0.288 -0.279
Error to -Ndr 0.015 1.542 -0.037 0.288 0.279
Structural Error to Ncf 0.010 -0.035 0.020 -0.050 -0.062
Structural Error to -Ndr 0.100 0.035 -0.020 0.050 0.062
News terms corr/std Ncf -Ndr Gamma 10.136
Ncf 0.089 -0.577
-Ndr -0.577 0.133 J-stat p-value 0.002
Betas
Growth Neutral Value Growth Neutral Value
Cash Flow 0.069 0.180 0.280 -0.019 0.133 0.263
Discount Rate 1.265 1.038 1.043 0.947 0.837 0.900
E[Rm-Rf]
Predicted 0.006 0.017 0.029 -0.008 0.009 0.026 0.017
Realized 0.006 0.015 0.022 -0.002 0.002 0.011 0.018
Error 0.000 -0.002 -0.008 0.007 -0.007 -0.015 0.001
Betas (early sample)
Growth Neutral Value Growth Neutral Value
Cash Flow 0.373 0.433 0.547 0.190 0.337 0.515
Discount Rate 0.905 0.851 0.930 0.695 0.713 0.826
E[Rm-Rf]
Predicted 0.025 0.035 0.057 -0.013 0.014 0.049 0.061
Realized 0.013 0.016 0.026 -0.002 0.004 0.017 0.025
Error -0.012 -0.018 -0.031 0.011 -0.011 -0.032 -0.036
Betas (late sample)
Growth Neutral Value Growth Neutral Value
Cash Flow -0.450 -0.249 -0.172 -0.375 -0.213 -0.163
Discount Rate 1.878 1.354 1.232 1.375 1.046 1.025
E[Rm-Rf]
Predicted -0.007 0.005 0.010 -0.005 0.005 0.009 -0.014
Realized 0.002 0.014 0.019 -0.001 0.001 0.006 0.013
Error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.027
Large
E[Ri-Rm]
Small
Table 4 - Restricted VAR estimate, 5 variables
Large
Note: The table shows the results obtained with a first-order VAR model including a constant, the log excess market return (Rm),
the price-earnings ratio (PE), the term yield spread (TY), the small-stock value spread (VS), and the default yield spread (DEF).
The upper panel reports the estimates of the transition matrix of the VAR (standard errors in parentheses) and the R2 of each
regression. It also reports the coefficients mapping state variable shocks into news terms for both a reduced-form VAR and a
structural VAR where Rm is ordered first and PE second. Finally, the upper panel reports the correlation matrix of the shocks
with shock standard deviations on the diagonal, and the risk aversion parameter Gamma implied by the ICAPM model estimated
as in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) using the six size/book to market sorted portfolios. The lower panel reports cash flow
and discont rate news betas for the six portfolios, the predicted and realized mean return of each portfolio in excess of the
market, as well as the equity premium. Betas and excess returns are reported for the full sample (1929:2-2010:4) as well as for
the early (1929:2-1963:2) and late (1963:3-2010:4) subsamples.
E[Ri-Rm]
Small Large
E[Ri-Rm]
Small